. Minister of State Security David MahloboSouth Africa’s intelligence gathering institutions must operate within the parameters of the constitution, human rights ethos and democracy, writes William Gumede.
Johannesburg - The astonishing leak of documents from South Africa’s State Security Agency brings into sharp focus the need to rethink the role, use and oversight of official intelligence gathering and institutions in a constitutional democracy.
One striking observation is that it would seem government critics, civil society activists and ordinary citizens pursuing legitimate business are increasingly being brought under surveillance. This instead of criminals, corrupt politicians and countries, groups and individuals who are trying to snatch local technology, such as the Rooivalk, the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor and the anti-tank missile blueprints.
Yet one positive point to have emerged from the spy cable debacle is that South Africa’s intelligence agency resisted some foreign requests to monitor key civil society activists, foreign opposition leaders and dissidents.
According to the documents, the South Koreans asked for information about Kumi Naidoo, the head of Greenpeace; the Cameroon government wanted Cameroon’s opposition leader Pierra Mila Assoute closely watched; the Sri Lanka government wanted to monitor Tamil groups allegedly active in South Africa; and the Rwanda government wanted permission to spy on opponents, particularly those classified as “negationists” (roughly those who question the official government interpretation of the Rwandan genocide).
Astonishingly, South African intelligence appeared to have, from the spy cables, agreed to spy on Zimbabwean “subversive” activists, organisations and individuals who critical of Robert Mugabe’s Zanu-PF government – “subversive” clearly in Mugabe parlance being any legitimate critics.
Certainly, democratic South Africa’s reluctance to pro-actively intervene in Zimbabwe by supporting, whether morally, politically or financially, pro-democratic activists, civil groups and movements, has been costly to South Africa.
Not only has it prolonged Mugabe’s never-ending presidency, bringing that country’s economy to its knees, with Zimbabweans fleeing to South Africa for survival, but it has damaged South Africa’s economy as well as our inaction helped foster foreign and domestic perceptions that South Africa may go the same way as Zimbabwe.
The intelligence’s analysis is correct that Africa has become the next frontier in the global battle for resources, with both industrial and emerging powers frantically pushing to grab control of Africa’s resources to reboot or grow their economies.
Sadly, many of our government leaders appear to be extraordinarily naïve, believing that to help us deal with South Africa’s high levels of poverty, emerging powers such as China will somehow benevolently give us free handouts because of “solidarity” as they too were “oppressed” by Western powers.
As the intelligence cables show, both industrial and emerging powers spent considerable resources getting their hands on the Rooivalk’s blueprints, resources such as uranium enrichment technology, or firms they can take over that will give them easy access to knowhow they can use to secure their own competitive advantage.
For South Africa to respond to the leak of intelligence documents to steam ahead with legislation such as the protection of state information bill, or the “secrecy bill”, that will punish whistleblowers and media reporting on state wrongdoing to up to 25 years in prison, would be astonishingly foolish, let alone anti-democratic.
Corruption of South African government leaders is certainly the greatest threat to the country’s security – not critical media, activists or civil groups.
Corrupt leaders will – while loudly proclaiming they are working in the interests of the “people” – sell the country’s national assets for self-enrichment, often cheaply.
Corrupt leaders are also vulnerable to extortion, in exchange for state assets. Leaders giving free access to national key points and restricted areas to friends, whether local or foreign, are one of the real reasons why supposedly “classified” information, blueprints and technology is obtained by competing countries.
For another, the policy of the “deployment” of cadres – which has in reality become the appointing of friends, family and allies to key positions in the intelligence services, without the necessary competency, skills and vetting – is costly. It is not likely that such deployees will be loyal to “national” interests or perform their duties properly.
Parachuting “deployees” without the necessary skills, competence and sense of national duty only unleashes bitter resentment among hardworking ordinary employees who are not so politically connected. It will likely make them feel devalued and uninterested in working for the common good because, they may rationalise, their “deployed” superiors will in any event undo all their hard work by “selling out” state assets for factional gain, self-enrichment or in the interests of the leaders who parachuted them into their jobs.
Not only will such “deployees” be easy pickings to secure information for personal gain, but the resentful hardworking ordinary employees will also have no motivation to be loyal to the national interests, given that their superiors do not care.
Using the intelligence services and other government entities for political battles – by purging those seen as “disloyal” to one or the other political faction, also undermines the security of the state.
Unfairly purged individuals may feel they have a legitimate reason to be “disloyal”, especially as they feel or know that those who purged them or who have replaced them care little for national interests.
Clearly, people appointed on merit, with a public “service” work ethic and who swear loyalty to the national interests of the country, and not to individuals, party bosses and factions, are the best safeguard to protect our interests.
South Africa’s intelligence services will have to focus on the right strategic issues, not on snooping on citizens going about legitimate business, such as journalists, civil society groups or critics of government.
They should focus on rampant criminal syndicates and gangs, corrupt businessmen and women and politicians – especially those who are politically connected.
They should safeguard the country’s strategic assets – be they technological advances, blueprints or innovations – from powerful industrial and emerging powers. They should understand that some powers may be allies, but they are also fierce competitors who will do anything to lay their hands on such assets.
Parliamentary oversight of intelligence will have to be strengthened.
The office of the Inspector-General for Intelligence will have to be genuinely independent, properly resourced, and the occupant must be courageous enough to take on errant leaders, not matter how politically powerful and connected they are – in spite of this being career and life-threatening.
South Africa’s intelligence gathering institutions must operate within the parameters of the constitution, human rights ethos and democratic values.
Civil society, the media and individual, conscientious citizen must actively monitor the abuses of intelligence services – and raise the alarm, when they see wrongdoing.
In turn, they should be protected for performing such as a deeply patriotic duty.
* William Gumede is chairperson of the Democracy Works Foundation and author of Restless Nation: Making Sense of Troubled Times.
** The views expressed here are not necessarily those of Independent Media.
Sunday Independent
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